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 A funny thing happened after the Supreme Court decided Bush v. Gore,
1
 
the controversial December 2000 case ending the presidential election litigation 
between Al Gore and George W. Bush: over the next decade, from 2001 to 2010, 
the number of election law cases decided by the Supreme Court with a written 
opinion fell to 30 cases, the lowest level since the 1950s. The drop occurred at the 
Supreme Court even as the amount of election litigation in the lower courts more 
than doubled compared to the period just before Bush v. Gore and even as the 
scholarly field of election law exploded.  
This brief Article describes the drop in Supreme Court election law cases 
in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and offers at least a partial 
explanation as to the reasons for the drop. Although the general amount of 
election law litigation has risen dramatically since 2000, the number of cases in 
which parties sought Supreme Court review declined by more than 36 percent 
from the 1991-2000 decade compared to the 2001-2010 decade. The decline 
appears particularly steep after Justice O’Connor left the Court, replaced by 
Justice Alito. 
Factoring that decline into account, the data show that the Court issued 
written opinions in nearly the same percentage of election law cases each decade 
in which parties sought Supreme Court review—11.9% of cases in the 1991-2000 
decade, and 10.5% of cases in 2001-2010. While I cannot exclude the possibility 
that the Court shied away from hearing some election law cases out of Bush v. 
Gore fatigue or as the result of random noise, the drop in the number of election 
law cases in which litigants sought Supreme Court review cases seems to explain 
a great deal of the decline.   
This Article concludes by considering why the number of cases in which 
litigants sought Supreme Court review dropped so precipitously in 2001-2010 
even as the total number of election law cases in the lower courts increased 
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dramatically. One reason is that liberal litigants who had sought review especially 
in voting rights cases in the 1990-2000 period were less willing to do so in the 
2001-2010 period, likely because they expected unfavorable results before the 
more conservative Roberts Court. The 2005-2010 period is especially important; 
the number of election law petitions in the Supreme Court dropped precipitously 
after Justice Alito joined the Court. The other reason is that many of the lower 
court cases making up the election law explosion were state cases involving state 
statutory interpretation issues, rarely raising federal constitutional or statutory 
claims within the Supreme Court’s purview. 
 
I.  THE NUMBERS 
 
 Elsewhere I have chronicled the tremendous jump in twentieth century 
election law litigation which accompanied the Supreme Court’s decision to enter 
into the “political thicket” of reapportionment beginning with the Court’s 1962 
decision in Baker v. Carr.
2
 From the period 1901-1960, the Supreme Court 
decided an average of 10 election law cases per decade.  In contrast, from 1961-
2000, the Court averaged 60 cases per decade, a six-fold increase.
3
 From 1991-
2000 specifically, the Court decided 54 election law cases.
4
  
Measured as a percentage of election law cases on the Supreme Court’s 
total docket, in the 1901-1960 period, election law cases made up a meager 0.7% 
of the Court’s cases decided with a written opinion. From 1961-2000, that 
percentage increased seven and one-half times to an average 5.3% of cases.
5
   




 The 1991-2000 decade ended with the Supreme Court’s most controversial 
election law opinion of at least a generation, the Bush v. Gore decision.  How did 
the Court’s election law docket fare in the 2001-2010 period right after Bush v. 
Gore? From 2001-2010, the Supreme Court decided 30 election law cases with a 
written opinion, half the average for the 1961-2000 period.  The 2001-2010 
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 The Court wrote 54 election law cases out of 852 total cases with a written opinion in the 1991-
2000 period. 
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election law cases made up 4.2% of the Court’s docket for the decade.
7
 Figures 1 




Figure 1 Sources: Hasen, supra note 3; Appendix to this Note 
 
Figure 2.  Source: Hasen, supra note 3; author’s calculations 
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 One would have to go back to the pre-Baker 1951-1960 decade to find a 
decade with a smaller number of election law cases decided by the Supreme 
Court.
8
 Comparing the most recent decade to the decade before that one, the 
Court’s docket saw a 44% decrease in the number of election law cases decided, 
and a one-third decrease in election law cases as a percentage of the Supreme 
Court’s docket. 
 These statistics would be interesting enough if the amount of election law 
litigation in the lower courts remained static. However, it did not do so. The 
period after Bush v. Gore witnessed an explosion in the amount of lower court 
election law litigation. In the pre-2000 period, state and federal courts handled an 
average of about 94 election cases per year.  From 2001-2010, that number more 
than doubled to an average of 239 election cases per year.
9
 See Figure 3.  Thus, 
the Court saw a plunge in the number of election law cases decided just as the 




Figure 3.  
 
                                                                                                    
8
 The numbers are less dramatic considering the percentage of election law cases in the total 
Supreme Court docket.  One would have to go back only to 1981-1990 to find a decade with a 
smaller percentage (3.2%) of the Court’s total docket.  In that decade however, the Court decided 
1,387 cases, almost double the 712 cases decided in 2001-2010. 
9
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II.  POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS 
 
 Why did the Supreme Court’s docket see a dramatic decline in the number 
of written election law opinions the post-2000 period?  Here I consider four 
possible explanations based upon: (1) the nature of the Court’s election law cases; 
(2) the number of petitions in which litigants sought Supreme Court review in 
election law cases; (3) Bush v. Gore fatigue; and (4) random noise. 
 
A. The Nature of Supreme Court Cases 
 One possible reason for a decline in a class of cases decided by the 
Supreme Court in a written opinion would be if earlier Court opinions (or 
congressional action) cut off further issues for Supreme Court review. For 
example, if the Court decided that reapportionment cases were again non-
justiciable (as such cases were before 1962), then it would make sense that the 
number of such cases would go down. 
There is little in recent Supreme Court election law cases signaling the 
closing of the courthouse door in election law cases. If anything, the Court’s 
recent election law cases (including Bush v. Gore’s uncertain equal protection 
holding) have left the Court door open to new claims by creating new uncertainty 
in numerous election law areas.   
Specifically, the Court has thus far rejected partisan gerrymandering 
claims (Veith, LULAC
10
), but it (through Justice Kennedy, the deciding vote) has 
deliberately kept the door open for litigants to advance new arguments to 
demonstrate that particular partisan gerrymanders are unconstitutional. The Court 
has created new uncertainty about the meaning of section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act, seeming to merge some of the standards for section 2 violations with the 
standards applicable to unconstitutional racial gerrymanders (LULAC, Bartlett).  It 
has left open the question of the constitutionality of Section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act (NAMUDNO), raised new statutory questions about the meaning of Section 5 
(Riley), and potentially muddied the relationship between Section 5 and 
unconstitutional racial gerrymandering claims (Easley).  The Court has shifted its 
campaign finance jurisprudence wildly, going from a period of unprecedented 
deference to campaign finance laws (Shrink Missouri, Beaumont, McConnell) to a 
period of unprecedented skepticism (Citizens United, Davis, WRTL), opening up 
the courts to new challenges over longstanding campaign finance and related 
practices.  It has signaled a future battle over the scope of as-applied exemptions 
to government laws mandating the disclosure of campaign finance and similar 
election information (Doe). It has also recognized that campaign spending in 
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judicial elections may create due process problems that require judicial recusal, 
but it did not provide firm guidelines about when due process requires recusal 
(Caperton).  The Court has upheld the use of voter identification laws under some 
circumstances (Purcell), but it set forth a constitutional test through a two three-
Justice plurality opinions leaving great uncertainty in the scope of the law 
(Crawford).
11
  The Court decided its most recent case raising First Amendment 
associational rights questions about a state’s political primary rules as an as-
applied challenge, leaving the door open to future, fact-specific challenges related 
to the specific nature of each state’s primary system (Washington State Grange).   
In short, while there is much to say about the Court’s election law 
jurisprudence from the last decade, it would not seem fair to characterize the 
jurisprudence as closing off areas for further Supreme Court review. 
 
B. Decline in Supreme Court Election Law Cases in Which Litigants Sought 
Review 
 A more fruitful line of inquiry examines the number of cases in which 
parties sought Supreme Court review. If fewer litigants were asking for the 
Supreme Court to review their election law cases, that decline could help explain 
why the Court could decide to take fewer cases.  
To examine whether there was a decline in the number of cases in which 
litigants sought review, I considered petitions for writs of certiorari and 
jurisdictional statements in direct appeals
12
 listed in BNA’s U.S. Law Week 
annual subject index under “Elections” or “Apportionment”
13
 from January 1, 
                                                                                                    
11
 Christopher S. Elmendorf & Edward B. Foley, Gatekeeping vs. Balancing in the Constitutional 
Law of Elections: Methodological Uncertainty on the High Court, 17 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. 
J. 507 (2008). 
12
 By statute, certain redistricting, voting rights, and campaign finance cases come up to the 
Supreme Court on direct appeal from a three-judge court rather than through a discretionary 
petition for writ of certiorari.  For background on the direct appeal process see Joshua A. Douglas, 
The Procedure of Election Law in Federal Courts, 2011 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), draft 
available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1679518; Michael E. Solimine, 
The Three-Judge District Court in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 132 
(1996). About half the cases the Court decided from 2001 to 2010 came to the Court on direct 
appeal rather than through a petition for certiorari.  As I explain in Hasen, supra note 3,  discussing 
the Court’s treatment of the famous poll tax case, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 
663 (1966), the Court is more likely to take cases coming to it on direct appeal. Unlike with denial 
of a petition for writ of certiorari, a summary affirmance of a lower court decision has actual, 
though limited, precedential value. Illinois State Bd of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 
U.S. 173, 182-83 (1979); see also Michael E. Solimine, Institutional Process, Agenda Setting, and 
the Development of Election Law on the Supreme Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.  767, 796-99 (2007) 
(discussing direct review by the Supreme Court in recent election law cases). 
13
 I excluded non-election law cases listed under apportionment, and counted each case only once 
per term.  A handful of cases were listed in multiple years as cases were held over from one term to 
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1991 in the 1990-91 term through the October 2010 term (including decisions 
made no later than December 31, 2010).  For 1991-2000, BNA lists 454 election 
law petitions. In that period the Court issued 54 written opinions in election law 
cases, a written opinion rate of 11.9 percent. For 2001-2010, BNA lists 287 
election law petitions.  In the latter period the Court issued 30 written opinions in 
election law cases, a written opinion rate of 10.5 percent. Comparing the decades, 
the number of election law petitions considered by the Court dropped by over 36 
percent from one decade to the next.   
Thus, the Court agreed to consider and write opinions in close to the same 
percentage of election law cases in which litigants filed petitions in the last two 
decades. A dramatically different input (the universe of election law cases that the 
Court could agree to hear and issue a written opinion) led to a proportionally 
similar output (the number of Supreme Court election law written opinions).  
Figure 4, appearing and discussed in Part III, shows the number of election law 
petitions by year over the last 20 years. 
 
C. Bush v. Gore Fatigue? 
 
 Though it appears that the main reason for the decline in written election 
law opinions by the Supreme Court is the lower number of petitions seeking 
review in the 2001-2010 period, I cannot eliminate two other possibilities. The 
first is Bush v. Gore fatigue. 
Is it possible that the Court has become gun-shy about deciding election 
law cases following the reactions on and off the Court to the controversial 
decision? There certainly is some evidence that the Court has tried to avoid 
controversy surrounding Bush v. Gore itself. Since the case was decided, no Court 
opinion—majority, plurality, concurrence, or dissent—has cited or even 
mentioned the case.
14
 This is so even though it would have been natural to cite the 
                                                                                                                                     
the next, but the dispersion of these cases seemed to be random, and I did not go through and 
remove these cases from my count.  For years at the edges of my study count—1991, 2000, and 
2010—I counted petitions in which the Court had made a final decision (to deny a petition for 
certiorari, dismiss or affirm a direct appeal, or decide a granted case on the merits) on that petition 
in that calendar year.  Finally, my count for cases in the latter part of the 2010 period came not 
from the annual subject index (which was not yet available for the October 2010 term), but from an 
electronic index from BNA which lists all petitions. 
14
 Chad Flanders, Please Don’t Cite This Case! The Precedential Value of Bush v. Gore, 116 
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 141, 144 (2006), http://thepocketpart.org/2006/11/07/flanders.html 
(noting that the Supreme Court had not cited Bush v. Gore for any proposition).  As of March 
2011, the only almost-exception is Chief Justice Roberts’ concurring opinion in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission, in which the Chief Justice cited my book which has the words 
“Bush v. Gore” in the title. 
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case in certain opinions.
15
 It is quite rare to find a Supreme Court case (at least a 
few years old) aside from Bush v. Gore that has not been cited at least once by 
some Justice at least for some anodyne proposition.
16
 
 Whether the Court’s reticence in relation to Bush v. Gore translates into a 
general reluctance to hear election law cases is a plausible conjecture, but there is 
no way that the conjecture could be proven short of an admission from Supreme 
Court Justices about an internal practice to avoid such cases. (Even asking for an 
admission would not work if Bush v. Gore has led to a subconscious reluctance to 
decide such cases.) Certainly in considering the election law cases that the Court 
did decide from 2001-2010, the Court has not shied away from controversy. 
Citizens United, for example, is probably the most prominent and controversial 
Supreme Court case in any subject area since Bush v. Gore. The Court also 
considered the constitutionality of controversial voter identification provisions 
from Indiana (Crawford) and a lawsuit over the Tom DeLay-inspired Texas re-
redistricting.(LULAC). If the Court in the last decade had been trying to avoid 
controversy in election law cases, it did not do a very good job. 
  If the conjecture that Bush v. Gore made the Court gun-shy is correct, the 
Court should become more willing to hear election law cases going forward, as 
the controversy over Bush v. Gore fades with time. This suggests that, all else 
being equal, we should see an uptick in the number of election law cases heard 
from 2011-2020, even if the number of election law petitions seeking review 
remains constant. 
 
D. The Decline as Random Noise?  
 
 Though the Bush v. Gore hypothesis is plausible, it is also plausible that 
part of the decline in election law cases in the last decade is nothing more than 
random noise. Looking across the decades, there is considerable variation in the 
number of election law cases decided per decade. For example, without detailed 
examination of the petitions considered,
17
 it is hard to explain the precipitous drop 
in the number of election law cases decided with a written opinion from the 80 
cases in the 1971-1980 period to the 44 cases in the 1981-1990 period.    
                                                                                                    
15
 See Richard L. Hasen, When “Legislature” May Mean More than “Legislature:” Initiated 
Electoral College Reform and the Ghost of Bush v. Gore, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 618-19 
(2008) (discussing the failure of Chief Justice Rehnquist to discuss his Bush v. Gore concurrence 
in his dissent from denial of a certiorari petition in a case raising almost an identical issue). 
16
 After a long search, I found another rare exception, Ohler v. U.S., 529 U.S. 753 (2000).  As of 
March 2011, Ohler, like Bush v. Gore, had not been cited by the Supreme Court for any 
proposition, 
17
 One possibility: the earlier period marked the beginning of the Court’s sustained effort to 
interpret the Voting Rights Act and federal, state and local campaign finance laws.   
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Part of the decline in the 2001-2010 decade might be due to the 
opportunity cost of hearing election law cases. The Court hears only a small 
percentage of cases in which litigants sought review. It might be that the Supreme 
Court had more compelling cases to review in the 2001-2010 period aside from 
election law cases. The last decade at the Supreme Court saw important decisions 
related to the scope of federal power, the war on terror, Second Amendment gun 
rights, gay rights, federal sentencing, and the scope of constitutional criminal 
procedure protections. Some election law disputes simply may have been less 
compelling for a Court that has seen fit to shrink its overall docket dramatically 
overall in the last two decades.  If this explanation is correct, it is hard to predict 
whether we would see some uptick in the number of election law cases being 
decided in the current decade, closer to the historic post-1960 rates of cases.  It 
depends upon the nature of the other petitions filed in the Court. 
 
 III.  EXPLAINING THE DECLINE IN ELECTION LAW  
LITIGANTS SEEKING SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
 
 The last section posits that the most plausible explanation for the decline 
in election law cases heard by the Court the last decade was a decline in the 
number of petitions seeking review in election law cases. Why did the Court’s 
docket see a dramatic decline in the number of election law cases in which 
litigants sought Supreme Court review?  Here, I suggest two possibilities. First, 
my earlier research has shown that much of the post-Bush v. Gore increase in 
election law litigation in the lower courts involved statutory interpretation 
questions under state law.
18
 These cases typically would not be good candidates 
for U.S. Supreme Court review, because the Court reviews only constitutional and 
federal statutory questions, not state law questions (except in the rare case in 
which the state law interpretation itself raises a constitutional question, as in Bush 
v. Gore).  
 Second, there is some evidence that liberal litigants are more wary of filing 
petitions in election law cases before the more conservative Roberts Court.
19
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 See Hasen, supra note 9. 
19
 See Richard L. Hasen, How Liberals Can Win by Losing at the Roberts Court,  SLATE, Sept. 14, 
2009, available at: http://www.slate.com/id/2228257/.  On the general question of litigant strategy 
before the Supreme Court and how that shape’s the Court’s docket, see VANESSA BAIRD, 
ANSWERING THE CALL OF THE COURT: HOW JUSTICES AND LITIGANTS SET THE SUPREME COURT 
AGENDA 4 (2007) (“The main argument [in this book] is that the incentive to support litigation in 
particular policy areas varies over time in accordance with litigants’ changing perceptions of 
Supreme Court justices’ policy priorities”).  Another possibility, which I do not explore here, is 
that incentives related to attorneys fees in civil rights cases have led to a decline in the number of 
cases that make it to final judgment, and therefore the number of cases in which Supreme Court 
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Figure 4, which charts the election law petitions filed in the Supreme Court each 
year in the last two decades shows what appears to be a precipitous drop around 
the time that Justice Alito replaced Justice O’Connor in the mid-2000s. For 
example, a litigant seeking to expand the scope of the Voting Rights Act would be 
foolish to try to do so before the current Supreme Court, where a majority seems 
skeptical of both the Act’s reach and its constitutionality. It might be better for a 
litigant to live with a decision she dislikes from a lower court than to have a 
similar (or worse) decision nationalized by a Supreme Court ruling. 
 
 
Some evidence that litigants are responding to changes in the political 
valence of the Court comes if we break out two classes of election law petitions: 
campaign finance cases and cases raising issues under the Voting Rights Act.
20
  
The Voting Rights Act cases, many of which were filed by plaintiffs seeking 
                                                                                                                                     
review is possible.  See Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 532 U.S. 598 (2001).  But Buckhannon, a 2001 case, cannot explain the precipitous 
drop in petitions after 2005. 
20
 For these figures, I counted cases listed in the BNA subject index for “Elections” primarily 
under “campaign finance regulation” and “Voting Rights Act.”  But I also counted other cases as 
well when the description appeared to consider these issues (as with racial gerrymandering cases). 
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expansion of the Act, show a general decline from the 1990s forward, with only a 
handful of cases being filed in the most recent Roberts Court period.
21
 The 
campaign finance cases are more volatile, with an unsurprising peak soon after 
Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“McCain-
Feingold”).  The last few years show an uptick, which corresponds to the period in 
which the Roberts Court has struck down or limited every campaign finance case 
it has considered thus far.
22
  Most of the recent campaign finance petitions filed in 
the Supreme Court challenge the constitutionality of campaign finance laws 
upheld by lower courts. There are few cases in which a lower court has struck 
down a campaign finance law and a government or campaign finance reform 
group seeks to get the Supreme Court to reverse a finding of unconstitutionality.   
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The shrinking of the Supreme Court’s election law docket in the last 
decade is noteworthy. While it does not appear to mark a retreat from the political 
thicket, it does show that the Court’s willingness to provide guidance on the scope 
of the constitutional and statutory rules of the political process ebbs and flows 
over time. It is easy to casually attribute the decline to a Supreme Court’s recoil 
from the reaction to the controversial Bush v. Gore decision.  But correlation does 
not prove causation.  It seems more plausible that the main cause of the decline 
was a decrease in the number of petitions seeking Supreme Court review in more 
recent years, which could itself be the product of the rise of a more conservative 
Supreme Court as Justice Alito replaced Justice O’Connor. If that’s the case, the 
number of election law cases heard by the Supreme Court should remain low, 
unless conservative litigants bring more suits to reverse or cabin earlier, more 
liberal election law precedents. 
 
APPENDIX: SUPREME COURT ELECTION LAW CASES DECIDED BY A 
WRITTEN OPINION, 2001-2010 
 
1. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001) 
2. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001) 
3. FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 533 U.S. 431 
(2001) 
                                                                                                    
21
 I would expect some uptick in the next few years, as Voting Rights Act cases arising out of the 
new round of redistricting work their way through the courts to the Supreme Court. 
22
 The cases are: Randall v. Sorrell, Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC, Davis v. FEC, and Citizens 
United. 
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4. Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002) 
5. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) 
6. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254 (2003) 
7. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003) 
8. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) 
9. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) 
10. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) 
11. Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005) 
12. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2006) 
13. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006) 
14. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 
15. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) 
16. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) 
17. Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437 (2007) 
18. FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007) 
19. New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008) 
20. Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 
442 (2008) 
21. Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008) 
22. Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406 (2008) 
23. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008) 
24. Brunner v. Ohio Republican Party, 129 S. Ct. 5 (2008) 
25. Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association, 129 S. Ct. 1093 (2009) 
26. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009) 
27. Caperton v. Massey, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) 
28. NAMUDNO v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) 
29. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) 
30. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) 
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